Are Iraqi Shias trying to free themselves from Iranian influence?

“Al-Sudani just represents a very convenient excuse for Muqtada al-Sadr to voice his displeasure with the entire Coordination Framework and the political system in Iraq,” Marsin Alshamary, a research fellow the Harvard Kennedy School, told Al Jazeera. “He would have done this if anyone else were nominated. Al-Sudani actually represents one of the least controversial figures from the Coordination Framework.”

Sadr, heir to a prominent clerical dynasty who fought U.S. forces after the invasion, has long opposed foreign influence.

He raised the stakes in June when he instructed his lawmakers to quit parliament, ceding dozens of seats to the Iran-aligned factions. Their subsequent moves towards forming a government without Sadr prompted the parliament takeover.

Sadr’s recent call for unspecified changes to the constitution may indicate he wants to upend the entire system.

But some analysts question how much he really wants to change a system that has served him well: Sadr dominates much of the state which employs many of his followers.

“Sadr is no revolutionary. He wants the system to go on but with him in a more dominant position,” said Toby Dodge, a London School of Economics professor.

Dodge described the standoff as “a squabble within an increasingly unpopular elite” in a country where poor governance and corruption has inflicted power and water cuts, poverty and unemployment on Iraqis, despite enormous oil wealth.

Those same conditions fuelled mass protests across Baghdad and southern Iraq in 2019 in which security forces killed hundreds of protesters.

“There could be miscalculations and mistakes. But it seems to me that in every stage in this process, either one side or the other has taken steps to avoid violence,” Dodge said.

Hamdi Malik of the Washington Institute think tank noted signs of restraint by both sides, but said conflict was a risk.

“Any civil war between Shi’ite groups will have a profound impact not only on … people in Iraq, but the wider region and even other parts of the world, not least because of the possible disruption in oil supplies, as much of Iraq’s oil wealth is located in predominantly Shi’ite parts of the country,” he said.

The incident on Wednesday, and al-Sadr’s subsequent show of control over his followers, carried an implicit warning to the Coordination Framework of potential escalation to come if a government forms with al-Sudani at the helm.

Al-Sadr has shown that even if his supporters are not seated in parliament, he cannot be ignored by Iraq’s politicians, and can gather protesters to put his point across.

To make its inroads into Iraq, Iran has pursued a fundamental political goal: to unite the country’s Shia groups and help empower the co-religious community by translating their demographic weight into political influence.

Unless Al Sadr’s requests are addressed, or an attempt is made by the Iraqi government to negotiate a settlement that would suite all sides, protests may continue and evolve into a civil strife, spelling an end to any visions of a political and economic solution in the medium term.

To many observers, the latest standoff shows that the pro-Iran camp in Iraq’s Shia community is still powerful enough to outmanoeuvre Al-Sadr and even use Iran’s influence to corner the powerful cleric as the government crisis drags on.

Reports that Iran has succeeded in convincing the leaders of the self-ruled Kurdistan Region of Iraq to end their dispute over the election of a new president of the country that would then pave the way for ending the government stalemate suggests a major win for Tehran.

This is why the betting that Iran’s influence in Iraq is in decline based on Al-Sadr’s ability to block the parliament’s sessions may be far-fetched or wishful thinking.

Nevertheless, Sadr and his supporters remain a powerful force to be reckoned with that Iran cannot ignore.